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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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POLICY REVIEW

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Mr Acting Director of Personnel Policy, Planning, and Management Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

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Dear Mr.

This is in further reference to your memorandum of May 28. STATINTL 1980, requesting a waiver to the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.48 to permit polygraph examination of

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__ In view of the concerns which have been expressed in this particular case, the requested waiver is hereby granted. It is important to point out, however, that this case should not be construed as establishing a precedent.

As you know, with the exception of civilian employees of the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense does not, as a general rule, utilize the polygraph for security clearance screening purposes. We do permit the Central Intelligence Agency to polygraph those military personnel who are assigned to CIA and have "staff-like" access." Military personnel who are detailed to CIA are not subject to polygraph except on a case-by-case basis when a waiver is granted. It has never been our policy to permit polygraph of military personnel who are on TDY at the CIA for short periods of time. Indeed, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in his memorandum of December 19, 1977, indicates clearly that it is the intent of our policy "to preclude the conduct of polygraph examinations of DoD personnel who might have only an occasional or limited working relationship with the CIA.'

Our rationale for strictly limiting and controlling the use of the polygraph for clearance screening purposes is based, in part, on the fact that the polygraph, although very useful, is not 100 per cent accurate. It is significant that polygraph results are not admissible as evidence in the judicial procedure, except in limited instances where both parties to litigation stipulate that there is no objection.

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We are quite mindful of the significant opposition to the use of the polygraph, both in the Congress and elsewhere. We are concerned that any broadening of the Department of Defense utilization of polygraph for clearance screening purposes, or a perception of such a broadening of use, might trigger restrictive legislation in this area.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. O'Brien

Director

Security Plans and Programs

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